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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR THE YEAR 1954
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
A REVIEW of Agency, Partnership, and Corporation cases
decided by the courts of southwestern jurisdictions failed
to produce any real changes in the law. This survey will, however,
present some of the most recent developments and clarifications.
WHEN IS A PARTNERSHIP A LEGAL ENTITY?
While the business world has traditionally regarded the part-
nership as a legal entity distinct from and independent of the per-
sons composing it, the law has refused to recognize its separate
existence, considering it to be a mere relationship among the
independent partners.' Two southwestern jurisdictions, Oklahoma
and Louisiana, deviate from this common law view, holding "The
partnership, once formed and put into action, becomes in contem-
plation of law, a moral being, distinct from the persons who
compose it" at least to the extent that partners are not owners of
partnership property but own only the residuum which may be left
from the entire property after obligations of the partnership are
discharged.2 Furthermore, the current authorities construing the
Federal Bankruptcy Act agree that in contemplation of that statute,
a partnership is a distinct entity;3 while the Uniform Partnership
Act seems to adopt the common law view.4 It is well established
in Texas that for purposes of Rule 28 of Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, providing persons engaged in business as a partnership may
sue or be sued in their firm name that the partnership is a legal
entity.5 The scope of Rule 28 is purely procedural, however, and
I Glascock v. Price, 92 Tex. 271, 47 S.W. 965 (1898); Martin v. Hemphill,
Tex ....... 237 S.W. 550 (1922) ; Feldman v. Seay, 291 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
2 Rex White v. Tulsa Iron & Metal Corp., 185 Okla. 606, 95 P. 2d 590 (1939) ; Heaton
v. Schaffer, 34 Okla. 631, 126 Pac. 797 (1912); Holmes v. Alexander, 52 Okla. 122,
152 Pac. 819 (1915) ; Brinson v. Monroe Automobile Supply Co., 180 La. 1064, 158 So.
558 (1934) ; Succession of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 1 So. 929 (1887).
3 Timlin v. Bryan, 165 F. 166 (5th Cir. 1908) ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Coover,
27 Okla. 131, 111 Pac. 217 (1910).
4 Uniform Partnership Act, § 6 (1).
5 Johnson v. Pioneer Mortgage Co., 264 S.W. 2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error rel.
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does not change the substantive rights of the owners of a business
under an assumed name.
This year the Texas courts were presented with an opportunity
to change the common law rule when in Aboussie v. Aboussie' a
partnership was sued in its trade name by a minor child of one
of the partners for personal injuries sustained through the negli-
gence of another member of the firm. It was held that a minor
child, being unable to sue its parents for ordinary negligence, is
unable to sue a partnership in which her father is a member. The
court ruled a partnership is not a legal entity and that Texas law
recognizes no personality in a partnership other than those who
compose it.
WIEN IS A CORPORATION PRACTICING LAW?
While a corporation enjoys many privileges of a natural person
it is recognized that it cannot engage in the practice of law.7 Al-
though there is no judicial dissent from this proposition, there is
a problem with regard to what acts amount to a corporate prac-
tice of law. The Arkansas Supreme Court in a 1954 case held
that when a national bank conducted probate proceedings, through
its own employees who were licensed attorneys, upon estates in
which the bank was named executor, it was engaging in unauthor-
ized practice of law.' The court reasoned that although a corpora-
tion could represent itself in court through employees who were
licensed attorneys, a corporation was not representing itself when
acting as an administrator, executor, or in a similar fiduciary
capacity.
The only authority cited by the court was dictum in the Minne-
sota case of In Re Otterness9 wherein it was stated that although
persons could appear in court to represent themselves when parties
to a lawsuit, executors, administrators, and guardians were not
such parties to an action that they might appear without counsel.
6270 S.W. 2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.
7 Hexter Title & Abstract v. Grievance Committee, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S.W. 2d 946
(1944); 157 A.L.R. 283.
8 Arkansas Bar Association v. Union Bank,---........-Ark .. ,273 .W. 2d 408 (1954).
9181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930).
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The language of the Arkansas case is very broad and leaves
unsettled whether or not, after probate of a will, the corporate
executor could appear in court through its attorney employees for
the purpose of suing or being sued.
The cases in other jurisdictions uniformly hold that if a bank
or trust company may by statute exercise the privilege of executing
trusts or estates, they may, through their regular attorney em-
ployees, draft instruments and appear in court incident to the
administration of the trust or estates in their hands.1 The Arkansas
Court noted these cases but expressly and summarily disagreed
with their reasoning and conclusions.
LIMITATIONS ON CORPORATIONS HOLDING REAL ESTATE
In a significant decision the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently
held constitutional the statute prohibiting corporations from hold-
ing land for more than seven years and expressly exempting busi-
ness trusts from such limitations." A probable result of this deci-
sion will be to expect a future trend toward business trusts by
companies wishing to avoid the real estate limitation. One of the
objects of a business trust is to obtain for the associates most of
the advantages of a corporation and still retain the freedom from
restrictions and regulations generally imposed by law upon the
corporation. This is especially true in Oklahoma where the bene-
ficiaries and trustees of business trusts are free from personal
liability on debts of the trust when the trustees are vested with
title to trust properties and have the exclusive right to manage
and conduct the business of the trust free from any control on
the part of the beneficiaries.'" This same inducement would not
exist in Texas because the beneficiaries are recognized as partners
regardless of whether or not the trustees are independent of
control. 3
10 Merrick v. American Security & Trust Company, 71 App. DC 72, 107 F. 2d 271
(1939) ; Detroit Bar Association v. Union Guardian Trust Company, 282 Mich. 216,
276 N.W. 365 (1937) ; Judd v. City Trust and Saving Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E. 2d
288 (1937).
11 State v. Hopping Inv. Co., ...... Okla ........ 269 P. 2d 997 (1954).
12 Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Sullivan -_.-..Okla ....... 229 Pac. 561 (1924).
Is Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 534 (1925).
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LIABILITY OF A CORPORATION SUCCEEDING TO THE BUSINESS
OF A PARTNERSHIP
It is well settled in most jurisdictions that when the property of
a partnership is transferred to a corporation without consideration
other than capital stock issued to the partners and the corporation
is but a continuation of the old business, it will be liable for the
existing debts of the unincorporated firm.' 4 Closely related to this
proposition is the responsibility of the new corporation for the
torts of the predecessor. In a case of first impression in Oklahoma,
the Supreme Court held that the debts assumed by the new corpo-
ration include the predecessor's tort liabilities. 5
The holding in this case emphasizes the principle that the cor-
porate entity is not just a cloak that can be donned or shed at the
convenience of partners or shareholders. The entity will be recog-
nized to protect the corporation in its business but the concept will
not be carried so far as to enable the corporation to become a
vehicle to evade responsibility.'"
Robert K. Pace.
14 S & J Supply Co. v. Warren, 191 Okla. 683, 133 P. 2d 201 (1943); Stowell v.
Garden City News Corporation, 143 Kan. 840, 57 P. 2d 12 (1936) ; 149 A.LR. 798.
15 Jones v. Eppler, ----Okla ... 266 P. 2d 451 (1954).
16 McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504 (1910).
